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I. Introduction
There is a misdemeanor crisis in the United States. The
recent exponential growth in lower court prosecutions for “minor”
charges has drawn increasing numbers of individuals into contact
with the criminal justice system.1 Those individuals exit with a
permanent, easily accessible electronic record of that contact that
can affect future employment, housing, and many other basic
facets of daily life.2 After two decades of declining crime,3 police,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges have stayed busy by
shifting their focus from serious crimes to petty misdemeanors. A
2010 analysis of seventeen state courts revealed that
misdemeanors comprised 77.5% of the total criminal caseload in
1. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO,
NAT’L ASS’N CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009)
[hereinafter MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE] (estimating that the volume of
misdemeanor cases rose from 5 million in 1972 to 10.5 million in 2006, and that
in 2006 there was a “median misdemeanor rate of 3,544 per 100,000” people).
2. See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, National Inventory of the Collateral
Consequences of Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/Collater
alConsequences/QueryConsequences (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (search of
“misdemeanor” in Texas reveals 450 entries relating to collateral consequences
of “any misdemeanor” or particular misdemeanor convictions) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also James B. Jacobs, The Expanding
Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 177, 178 (2008) (“This Article documents how criminal history records are
expanding in scope and how their dissemination is proliferating.”).
3. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ARREST IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1990-2010, at 1 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4515 (“The number of murder arrests in the U.S. fell
by half between 1990 and 2010. The adult and juvenile arrest rates dropped
substantially in the 1990s, while both continued to fall about 20% between 2000
and 2010, reaching their lowest levels since at least 1990.”); Richard A. Oppel
Jr., Steady Decline in Major Crime Baffles Experts, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at
A17 (citing the steady decline in major crime after a peak in the early 1990s).
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those courts.4 Although mass incarceration continues to plague
states around the nation,5 the current criminal justice crisis is
more aptly characterized as one of mass misdemeanor
processing.
Legislators have added misdemeanor after misdemeanor
(and many local ordinances) to the criminal law books.6 Law
enforcement, applying “zero-tolerance” or “order-maintenance”
policing policies, has aggressively enforced those statutes.7
These mass misdemeanor arrests happen even though the
theory upon which zero-tolerance policing is based, namely
broken windows theory, did not envision moving so much petty
crime through the criminal judicial system.8 In the 1982
4. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24
(2012), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/CSP2010.aspx.
5. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917 (2011) (“California’s prisons
are designed to house a population just under 80,000, but at the time of the
decision under review the population was almost double that.”); see generally
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (highlighting disproportionate mass incarceration of
persons of color through the War on Drugs); MARC MAUER & MEDIA CHESNEYLIND, INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (2002) (exploring mass incarceration in the United States as a
result of “tough on crime” political attitudes that prevailed in the 1980s–1990s
and the wide-ranging effects on families and communities).
6. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 523−79 (2001) (describing the legislative process of
criminalization); see also THE SMART ON CRIME COALITION, RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS (2011), http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/
Resources/Resources/Ref/SmartOnCrimeCoalition.pdf (“Unfortunately, since the
initial publication of Smart on Crime in 2009 . . . [w]e continue to see our
criminal codes and sentences—and, therefore, the demand on law enforcement,
prosecutors, and prisons—expand.”).
7. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 2 (2001) (describing order-maintenance policing as
“proactive enforcement of misdemeanor laws and zero tolerance for minor
offenses”).
8. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 (linking visible public disorder, like broken windows,
to the neighborhood residents’ perception of safety and, more tenuously, to
violent crime in the neighborhood); see also K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from
Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing,
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 279 (2009) (“Order-maintenance policing
as described in Broken Windows neither demands nor suggests that zero
tolerance arrest policies are efficient, desirable, or effective methods to achieve
order and reduce fear.”); cf. HARCOURT, supra note 7, at 6–7 (scrutinizing
THE
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article, Broken Windows, authors Kelling and Wilson described
the order-maintenance function of the police officers that they
had observed on foot patrol in a Newark neighborhood:
If a stranger loitered, [Officer] Kelly would ask him if he
had any means of support and what his business was; if he
gave unsatisfactory answers, he was sent on his way.
Persons who broke the informal rules, especially those who
bothered people waiting at bus stops, were arrested for
vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.9

In this description, only one of the three scenarios ended in
an arrest. And it is not clear that the one arrest would end up
in a court. Indeed, Kelling and Wilson noted that “[o]rdinarily,
no judge or jury ever sees the persons caught up in a dispute
over the appropriate level of neighborhood order” and that “a
judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a police
officer.”10
Prosecutors have largely failed to exercise discretion and
seek justice in sorting through the huge number of
misdemeanor cases that the police send them, instead churning
high volumes through the overburdened lower courts.11
Indigent defense attorneys have in many instances abdicated
their professional, constitutional, and ethical duties to provide
effective, zealous representation to their misdemeanor
clients.12 Judges have been complicit, failing to dismiss weak
evidence and policy behind “broken windows” theory).
9. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 8, at 29.
10. HARCOURT, supra note 7, at 6.
11. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 24 (2007) (discussing the process in which prosecutors file charges
for misdemeanors); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the
Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1716 (2010)
(citing data showing low levels of prosecutorial declination of charges in petty
offense cases and noting that “[t]he fact that prosecutors so rarely declined petty
and public order cases reflects prosecutors’ well-substantiated expectation that
these cases are likely to be disposed of summarily and successfully”).
12. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 19 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE], available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/initiatives/indigent_defense_systems_improvement/gideons
_broken_promise.html (discussing the lack of investigation, research, and
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cases based on questionable police testimony or to intervene
when underresourced indigent defenders fail to provide
effective representation to their many clients.13 In short, there
is little reason to have confidence in the outcome of convictions
secured in our lower criminal courts,14 and much support for a
“crisis” characterization.15
The adaptions that allow institutional actors to process
high numbers of misdemeanor cases in overburdened lower
courts are a formidable force working against solutions to the
crisis. A major driver of the mass misdemeanor system is that
there is relatively little immediate and obvious cost,
particularly at a time when felony crime is relatively low.16
Almost no one spends enough time screening, defending, and
adjudicating misdemeanors to feel the full cost; in New York
City, for example, 2011 statistics show that fewer than 1 in 500
individuals charged with a misdemeanor go to trial.17 As the
Supreme Court recently noted, “plea bargaining is . . . not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.”18 In misdemeanor cases, those pleas happen quickly
zealous advocacy of indigent defense attorneys); MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE,
supra note 1, at 38−40 (discussing barriers to zealous representation in
misdemeanor courts).
13. See generally Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the
Court: Trial Court Responsibility for Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 425 (2004).
14. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1316
(2012) (discussing the high tolerance for wrongful petty convictions).
15. See generally John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving
Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing deprivations of
right to counsel in lower courts); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
277, 279−82 (2011) (describing the misdemeanor crisis); see also Cara H. Drinan,
The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s
Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 488 (2010) (noting the
persistence of the indigent defense crisis, despite substantial research and
evidence on the matter).
16. See SNYDER, supra note 3, at 1 (providing statistics showing a decline in
felony arrest rates in the United States).
17. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 16
(2011) [hereinafter NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT],
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/criminal/AnnualReport2011.pdf.
18. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912
(1992)).
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and are thus relatively cheap for the system; in some
jurisdictions, for example, almost 70% of lower criminal court
cases are resolved at arraignment.19
What if the criminal justice system did feel the immediate
cost of mass misdemeanor processing? Michelle Alexander’s
provocative New York Times Op-Ed, Go to Trial: Crash the
Justice System, explored the idea and potential effects of a
“large scale . . . refus[al] to plea-bargain when charged with a
crime.”20 There were understandably strong responses to the
Op-Ed, many of them focused on the impracticality of the
proposal, but some on the ethical problems with such an
approach.21 What these critiques often missed was Alexander’s
19. See ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, THREE MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 14–15 (2011), available at www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.
aspx?id=20794 (discussing observation of 1,649 misdemeanor adjudications in
twenty-one Florida counties, where “[a]lmost 70% of defendants observed
entered a guilty or no contest plea at arraignment”); SPANGENBERG GRP., STATUS
OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 142 (2006),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGrou
pReport.pdf (documenting how in 2000 in New York City, private attorneys
representing indigent defendants through an assigned counsel plan “were
disposing of 69 percent of all misdemeanor cases at arraignment”). While these
quick misdemeanor pleas allow mass volume in the lower courts at relatively
low cost, this cost calculation fails to account for long-term harms to society
flowing from the misdemeanor crisis. There is an enormous societal cost in the
form of a permanent and large group of individuals exiting the system with
misdemeanor convictions and thus serious obstacles to finding work and
housing. See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION NEED NOT APPLY: THE CASE FOR REFORMING
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN EMPLOYMENT 25 (2011), http://www.
nelp.org/page/-/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf?nocdn=1
(recognizing
that
despite regulations meant to protect those with criminal records, people are still
being categorically banned from employment); LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER
PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT ON STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 16 (2004), http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-toreentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf (discussing how public housing
authorities consider a person’s criminal record).
20. Michelle Alexander, Op-ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at SR 5.
21. See, e.g., Norm Pattis, Michelle Alexander’s Dangerous Pipe Dream,
NORMAN PATTIS BLOG (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.pattisblog.com/index.php?
article=Michelle_Alexanders_Dangerous_Pipe_Dream_5309 (last visited Apr. 2,
2013) (“The suggestion that individual clients commit what will amount to
individual and collective suicide to crash the system is a dangerous pipe dream.
No decent criminal defense lawyer will entertain the thought.”) (on file with the
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larger point: “The system of mass incarceration depends almost
entirely on the cooperation of those it seeks to control,” and
having a critical mass of defendants refuse to play along would
lead to “chaos [that] would force mass incarceration to the top
of the agenda for politicians and policy makers, leaving them
only two viable options: sharply scale back the number of
criminal cases filed . . . or amend the Constitution (or
eviscerate it by judicial ‘emergency’ fiat).”22
One might apply Alexander’s mass incarceration critique
to the mass arrest and prosecution crisis happening in the
lower criminal courts. There are many potential responses to
the misdemeanor crisis, including more rigorous prosecutorial
screening
and
exercise
of
discretion
in
charging
23
24
decisions, better funding for defender offices, statewide
caseload
oversight
of
public
defender
systems,25
Washington and Lee Law Review). Many of these responses unfairly ignored
that Alexander herself raised many of these issues within the Op-Ed. For
example, she described being “stunned” when someone first raised the idea of
organized plea refusals with her, noting that this person “knows the risks
involved in forcing prosecutors to make cases against people who have been
charged with crimes. Could she be serious about organizing people, on a large
scale, to refuse to plea-bargain when charged with a crime?” Alexander, supra
note 20, at SR 5.
22. Alexander, supra note 20, at SR 5.
23. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 19−41 (discussing importance and power of
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller,
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31–33 (2002) (pointing
to structured prosecutorial screening as an alternative to plea bargaining).
24. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 7–11, 13–14, 29–37,
41 (discussing various problems in indigent defense).
25. See COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006), http://www.courts.
state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report
06.pdf (outlining a proposal for a fully state-funded statewide defender system
to ensure the constitutional right to quality representation for indigent
defendants in New York State); GA CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEF. 3
(2001),
available
at
www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/idc
report.doc (“The state of Georgia lacks a statewide system of accountability and
oversight to provide constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel for indigent
defendants.”); NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING REASONABLE
CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE, 196–228 (2011)
[hereinafter REASONABLE CASELOADS], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_securing_reasonable_caseloads.authcheckd
am.pdf (analyzing state oversight of public defender programs in
Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and California).
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caps,26 decriminalization27 (assuming that funding for indigent
defense is not reduced), systemic litigation to force change,28
and more rigorous standards for defense practice.29 Some of
these responses focus on the legislative or executive branch,
some focus on defender office response or regulation, while only
a few focus on how the individual defender should respond to
the crisis.30
It is undisputed that indigent defense is an underfunded
mandate and that public defenders31 have workloads that make
26. See REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 25, at 54 (“In 2009, the New
York legislature passed a law requiring that . . . the state’s chief administrative
judge establish caseload caps in New York City for trial-level defenders. The law
also provides that the caseload caps should be phased in over a four-year period,
with the understanding that the increased costs associated with the caps be
borne by the State of New York.”).
27. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2008) (“[P]ossession of one
ounce or less of marihuana shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an offender
who is eighteen years of age or older to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars
and forfeiture of the marihuana, but not to any other form of criminal or civil
punishment or disqualification.”).
28. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellant at 21, Hurrell-Harring v. State,
930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 8866-07), 2009 WL 6409871, at *21
(complaining of “systemic deficiencies [that] create a severe or unacceptably
high probability that indigent criminal defendants will receive ineffective
assistance of counsel” in New York State).
29. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL
SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d. ed.
2004) (promulgated by the American Bar Association to create standards
relating to collateral consequences and discretionary disqualifications of
convicted individuals); UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT
(2010) (promulgated by Uniform Law Commission to encourage standards
relating to collateral consequences in criminal cases).
30. In an earlier article, I focused on the lack of—and need for—
constitutional and professional standards for the delivery of effective assistance
of counsel in misdemeanor cases. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 309−10. That
article described the misdemeanor crisis and discussed the different
institutional competencies of the legislature, the judiciary, professional
organizations, and the defense bar in responding to it. See id. at 330.
31. I use the word “public defender” in the general, nontechnical sense, to
include statewide public defender offices, non- or for-profits with contracts to
provide indigent defense services, and panel attorneys doing indigent defense
work. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 2 (describing three basic
models for delivery of indigent defense services: the public defender, appointed
counsel, and a bidding system); see also CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES, 1999, at 5 (2001), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf
(describing various methods of delivering indigent defense representation).
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effective representation of all clients difficult if not
impossible.32 A small but vibrant literature debates whether and
how public defenders should “triage” clients’ cases.33 There are
various proposals for the method of triage, but all would focus
limited resources on felonies and cut resources for “minor”
misdemeanor cases. While there may be intuitive appeal to such
an approach, it ignores a critical side effect of triage in favor of
serious cases: allowing the misdemeanor system to continue to
function in its current, harmful manner by depriving individuals
charged with misdemeanors of effective means of fighting the
charges against them.34
What if indigent defense counsel triaged in favor of
misdemeanor representation, and in particular focused on the
“petty,” quality-of-life misdemeanors that flood the system and
result in disproportionately harsh, permanent criminal records?
What if defenders put sufficient resources into such cases so that
clients felt they actually had the true choice of refusing to plead
guilty? The response to such a proposal would surely parallel the
negative response Alexander drew, including: it is unrealistic;
clients facing serious felony charges would suffer; and criminal
defense attorneys cannot reform the system on the backs of
individual clients, some of whom may be better served with a
quick guilty plea or other resolution in the lower courts.35
Yet truly minor misdemeanors are precisely the types of
cases in which a plea bargain is rarely much of a bargain for the
defendant. For example, a defendant might be “offered” a
sentence of time already served—which can mean the night spent
in jail awaiting arraignment, or even a fictional time period if the
person was never incarcerated—in exchange for pleading guilty

32. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 16–18 (discussing
problems in indigent defense).
33. See infra Part IV.A (discussing triage literature).
34. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political
Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 301 (1996) (“Lawyers influence and
shape the practices and institutions in which they work, if only to reinforce and
legitimate them.”).
35. Cf. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117,
1119−20 (2008) (“For the typical innocent defendant in the typical case— . . . a
recidivist facing petty charges—the best resolution is generally a quick plea in
exchange for a light, bargained-for sentence.”).
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to a misdemeanor of disorderly conduct.36 This may sound
advantageous, or at least not harmful, until the actual
consequences of this plea are added into the equation. This
conviction can, and does, lead to proceedings to evict an
individual from public housing.37 It can, and does, pose a bar to
demonstrating “good moral conduct” for citizenship.38 Perhaps
most significantly, in an era in which employers can, and do,
easily access electronic criminal records,39 the person taking the
“harmless” disorderly conduct plea will have difficulty finding
work.40 Indeed, this employment issue alone starkly illustrates
36. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-201 (West 2002) (stating disorderly
conduct is a misdemeanor).
37. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(ii)(A) (2010) (authorizing local public
housing authorities to prohibit admission based on certain types of criminal
activity). This includes criminal activity that “may threaten the health, safety,
or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents or persons
residing in the immediate vicinity; or. . . the health or safety of the owner,
property management staff, or persons performing a contract administration
function or responsibility on behalf of” the public housing authority. Id. My
clinic students have represented a client with a disorderly conduct conviction
facing the loss of public housing based on that conviction.
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006) (establishing a five-year period—which
includes showing “good moral character”—for naturalization requirement); id.
§ 1430(a) (establishing a three-year period showing “good moral character” as
naturalization requirement for specific categories of applicants, including
individuals married to and living with a U.S. citizen and individuals who
obtained lawful permanent resident status as the battered spouse of a U.S.
citizen).
39. In some states, these databases include both criminal and noncriminal
convictions, and records of the initial charge. In Maryland, for example, the
“Maryland Judiciary Case Search” database will reveal charges that resulted in
a “stet” or “nolle prosequi,” (which are equivalent to dismissal), as well as those
that ended in an acquittal. See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, MD. JUDICIARY,
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp (last visited Apr.
2, 2013) (providing “public access to the case records of the Maryland Judiciary”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). These nonconviction records
will be expunged only upon affirmative application of the individual and
payment of $30, provided there are no statutory bars to expungement (for
example, a conviction following a dismissal means the earlier dismissal can
never be expunged). See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105 (West 2012)
(setting forth grounds for expungement in Maryland); MD. R. 4-504 (setting forth
expungement procedures). In other states, such as New York, noncriminal
convictions (such as for minor, nonpublic marijuana possession) or dispositions
(such as deferred dismissals) will result in immediate or eventual automatic
sealing of the record. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.55 (McKinney 2011).
40. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937,
958 (2003) (describing her study showing serious negative effects of race and
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the way in which the most minor misdemeanor conviction has
serious implications for so many people.41
The underlying goal of this Article’s proposal to focus
defender resources on minor misdemeanors is to have more
defendants choose trial over a guilty plea, or at least reject a
quick, early guilty plea—understanding that declining to plead
guilty may lead to trial, but may also lead to deferral or
dismissal.42 More misdemeanor trials, or fewer guilty pleas at an
early court appearance, would impose serious strain on the
criminal justice system.43 If these costs filter down, prosecutors
criminal record on employment prospects). The same is true for landlords’ access
to public criminal records, and the resulting difficulty for an individual with
such a record to find private housing. See Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not
(Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal Background Tenant Screening as a Violation of
The Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 181 (2009) (“Increased
landlord discrimination against housing applicants with criminal histories has
made locating housing in the private market more challenging than ever for
individuals with criminal records.”).
41. RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining that many
employers of all types and sizes will not consider employees with a criminal
record).
42. See Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact
of Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 867–
82 (1996) (describing his analysis of clinic student representation, which showed
that a significant number of clinic clients who declined to plead guilty at
arraignment later got dismissals, deferred dismissals, or plea offers to reduced
charges); see also M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole Powell, Valuing Gideon’s
Gold: How Much Justice Can We Afford?, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 7−8) (discussing efforts of head of El Paso, Texas Public
Defender’s office to raise the office’s low trial rates and describing how, while
the efforts were a disappointment at first glance, a closer look at the data
showed a high rate of dismissal of charges) (on file with author). While
Hernandez, the head public defender, and Powell note that their data needs
further study and analysis, they describe how, after instituting various
programs to encourage more trials:
In FY2011 and 2012 we obtained dismissals on almost one quarter of
our felonies, more than one third of our misdemeanors, and one third
of our juvenile cases. In prior years, [Hernandez] had only focused on
trials and pleas, never on the best possible outcome, which is
dismissal of charges. [Hernandez] was pleased. Also, while our trial
rate was low, close to half resulted in acquittals. Moreover, 82% of all
our adult cases were resolved favorably relative to the prosecutor’s
initial plea-bargain offer.
Id.
43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE
L.J. 1969, 1976 (1992) (“More zealous defense means more evidence, more legal
arguments, tenacious insistence on exercising every right.”); George Fisher, Plea
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would be forced to decline prosecution in more cases. This may, in
turn, affect law enforcement, potentially leading the police to
exercise discretion in deciding whom they actually put through
the system. Finally, making the system bear more of the true
costs of adjudicating misdemeanor arrests would, hopefully, give
legislators a concrete reason (and perhaps some political
coverage) to decriminalize and to refrain from creating more
minor criminal offenses. In these ways, zealous attention to
misdemeanor representation—in addition to being one way of
dealing directly with the misdemeanor crisis—may advance other
methods of dealing with the misdemeanor crisis.
Defense attorneys cannot force their clients to go to trial or
decline to plead guilty; nor can they coerce clients to do so. But
they can offer zealous representation that allows clients to make
truly voluntary choices, and that representation can include an
invitation (in appropriate cases) to participate in a collaborative
effort to change the system by forcing it to bear some of the real
costs of mass misdemeanor processing.44 Currently, the entire
Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 893−936 (2000) (“Prosecutors took up
plea bargaining in part to escape the enormous [caseload] burdens of their
office.”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1950 (1992) (“In order to accommodate the dramatic increase in
trials [caused by an abolition of plea bargaining], the trial process itself would
have to be truncated.”). But see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 931, 1035 (1983) (“Indeed, the usual failure of prosecutors and trial
judges [in Philadelphia] to seek pleas of guilty reflected their recognition that a
nonjury trial often consumed fewer resources than the process of negotiating a
guilty plea and of making the record that would justify its acceptance in the
courtroom.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1037, 1040−41, 1047−50, 1053−86 (1984) (stating that “the inevitability of
bargaining depends on the assumed need for bargaining, and the theory thus
can be questioned to the extent that the ‘administrative need’ can be shown to
be illusory”).
44. Inviting clients to participate in a coordinated effort to “crash” the
system is cause lawyering, but properly done (e.g., not coercively) does not
conflict with the client’s interest. For a thorough analysis of “cause lawyering”
among criminal defense attorneys, see Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause
Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause
Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1197−98 (2005) (“Sometimes
criminal defendants are better represented by defense attorneys who are ‘cause
lawyers’ passionately seeking to advance their political and moral visions
through the representation of their clients than by attorneys who have no
overriding ‘cause’ other than the representation of the individual client.”).
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system—including defense counsel in many instances, often due
to a lack of resources—works to coerce guilty pleas and quick
dispositions in the lower criminal courts. It is a system that
violates professional, ethical, and constitutional norms on a daily
basis, and a system in desperate need of reform.
A defender focus on misdemeanor representation is an
approach that admittedly has drawbacks, and one that might
work only as a limited “experiment” in the right jurisdiction. It
also clearly is not an option in jurisdictions that openly or
indirectly violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases by failing to appoint counsel when the
defendant is sentenced to an actual or suspended term of
incarceration.45 This Article explores the idea of crashing the
system as one potential response to the misdemeanor crisis, at a
time when the lower courts are doing serious damage to
individuals and to society by burdening millions of people with
arrest and conviction records for minor offenses. Part II describes
the potential role for defense counsel in making the criminal
justice system feel the true cost of mass misdemeanor processing.
Specific strategies for a defender office focus on misdemeanors,
45. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (finding that the
Sixth Amendment bars imposition of suspended sentence that was entered
following “uncounseled conviction”); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371−73
(1979) (finding no right to counsel for sentence of fine); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). In one of the more
blatant statements about violating the right to misdemeanor counsel, South
Carolina’s chief justice called Alabama v. Shelton “one of the more misguided
decisions of the United States Supreme Court”:
If we adhered to it in South Carolina we would have the right to
counsel probably . . . by dragooning lawyers out of their law offices to
take these cases in every magistrate’s court in South Carolina, and I
have simply told my magistrates that we just don’t have the resources
to do that. So I will tell you straight up that we [are] not adhering to
Alabama v. Shelton in every situation.
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 1, at 15; see also Erica Hashimoto,
The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019,
1023 (2013) (discussing certain jurisdictions’ failure or refusal to enforce
Alabama v. Shelton). But see Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668−69 (noting how, under
state laws or constitutions as of 2001, “[a]ll but 16 States . . . would provide
counsel to a defendant . . . either because he received a substantial fine or
because state law authorized incarceration for the charged offense or provided
for a maximum prison term of one year” (emphasis added)).
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including specialized practice groups, are discussed in Part III.
Part IV begins with an explanation of various existing proposals
for public defender triage, and the argument against triage; it
then considers and responds to likely arguments against any
effort to crash the misdemeanor system.
II. Defense Counsel’s Role in Making the Criminal Justice System
Feel the True Cost of Mass Misdemeanor Processing
Recently, the Bronx District Attorney’s (DA) office “quietly
adopted” a new policy for misdemeanor trespass cases. Rather
than filing charges based on a police officer’s written affidavit,
with checked boxes to indicate allegedly unlawful conduct,
prosecutors must now first interview the arresting officer to
determine whether the arrest was lawful.46 This was a significant
reform in a borough of a city where police made more than 16,000
trespass arrests between 2009 and 2011.47 According to a Bronx
DA Bureau Chief, the office “had received numerous complaints
from defense lawyers who claimed that many of the people
arrested were not trespassers.”48 Indeed, public defender offices
are partners in federal court litigation filed to challenge the New
York City Police Department’s trespass stop and arrest policies.49
While it is difficult to assess the exact effect that lower court
46. See Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at A1 (explaining the new trespass-case screening
process).
47. Complaint at 26–27, Davis v. City of New York, 10 CIV. 699 SAS
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 4946243.
48. Goldstein, supra note 46, at A1.
49. See Complaint, supra note 47, at 3, 55–56 (lawsuit filed by various
organizations and law firms, including The Legal Aid Society, New York City’s
main indigent defense provider, alleging unconstitutionality of police
department practices relating to trespass stops and arrests); see also Ligon v.
City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 2274(SAS), 2012 WL 3597066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 2012) (lawsuit filed by various organizations and law firms, including
The Bronx Defenders, an indigent defense provider, challenging police
department’s “abusive practices of stopping, questioning, searching, citing, and
arresting residents of Clean Halls Buildings and their visitors without adequate
cause”). The Legal Aid Society is also co-counsel in a lawsuit alleging violations
relating to the police Department’s marijuana possession arrest practices.
Gomez-Garcia v. N.Y.P.D., No. 0451000-2012, 2012 WL 2362711, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 22, 2012).
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defense attorneys had, one thing is certain: “Trespass arrests in
the Bronx have fallen 38.2%, year to date, compared with 2011.”50
One of the attorneys involved at the inception of this
coordinated effort wrote about his clinic students’ representation
in a trespass trial he supervised:
Dwayne’s acquittal marked the end of the Pace Clinic’s direct
representation, but it was the beginning of the Clinic’s efforts
to organize a citywide advocacy coalition to end this pattern of
wrongful trespass arrests. Dwayne was one of twenty clients
that Clinic students represented on criminal trespass charges.
Fourteen of these cases were ultimately dismissed. Like
Dwayne, many of our clients have become engaged in collective
action against the over-policing of their neighborhoods.51

When law school clinic students represent misdemeanor
clients,52 those students have low caseloads, close supervision,
ample resources, and the opportunity to collaborate with
classmates. They have sufficient time to meet with the client and
to investigate the law and facts by visiting the scene, obtaining
911 calls and video surveillance, and interviewing witnesses.
They file substantive, nonboilerplate motions and fully prepare

50. Goldstein, supra note 46, at A1. In the other boroughs of New York
City, where there has yet to be prosecutorial action, trespass arrests are either
down very slightly, or up considerably. Id.
51. M. Chris Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in “ZeroTolerance” Policing Regimes, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351, 353 (2012)
[hereinafter Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics]; see also M. Chris
Fabricant, Rousting the Cops: One Man Stands Up to the NYPD’s ApartheidLike Trespassing Crackdown, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 30, 2007),
http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-10-30/news/rousting-the-cops/full/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the representation of a client in a criminal trespass
trial) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. Law students act as “student-attorneys” under the particular
jurisdiction’s rules governing student practice. In most jurisdictions, they can
handle, with appropriate supervision, all aspects of a misdemeanor case. See,
e.g., MD. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND, Rule 16
(setting forth requirements relating to “legal assistance by law students” in
Maryland).
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for any potential sentencing proceeding.53 In short, these students
offer high-quality representation in the lower criminal courts.54
Obviously, a busy public defender cannot devote the same
amount of time or resources that a clinic student devotes to each
client. However, the example illustrates the effect such attentive
clinic-student lawyering can have on clients. They are more willing
to go to trial and less eager to take a quick guilty plea. Surely the
reasons for this decision-making process and outcome are complex,
but undoubtedly one reason is that for clinic clients, going to trial
with an attorney who is prepared (if inexperienced) is a viable
option.55 There is no subtle—or not-so-subtle—message from
defense counsel of being too busy to handle this minor case properly.
There is no message that taking a plea is no big deal, and that
taking the plea early in the case is best. The result, at least in the
jurisdictions where I have supervised my own and observed other
student-attorneys, is that clinic students litigate pretrial issues
more often and more aggressively, bargain with more information,
and go to trial more in misdemeanor cases.56 Indeed, and rather
depressingly, some prosecutors complain that clinic students are
53. They can also attend to the nondirect consequences of the criminal case,
such as school suspension hearings or eviction from public housing. My students
in the Criminal Justice Clinic at American University, Washington College of
Law, have advocated in these and other noncriminal contexts for clients we also
represent in the criminal case.
54. See Zeidman, supra note 42, at 870 (comparing the “overall outcomes
from arraignment through final disposition” between law student
representatives and defense attorneys in New York County misdemeanor cases).
The comparison showed
that students’ clients plead guilty far less often than do the clients of
assigned counsel, and in cases where there is a plea, students’ clients
were far more likely to plead to reduced charges, and far less likely to
be sentenced to jail. Additionally, students achieved dismissals or
[deferred dismissals] almost twice as often as did institutional
defenders (44% versus 23%).
Id.; see also Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics, supra note 51, at
356 (stating that criminal defense clinic “[s]tudents are, and must be, deeply
engrossed in mastering each step in the adjudication of a criminal case”).
55. Notably, clinic clients rarely raise concerns, particularly after the
initial meeting with student-attorneys, about students’ lack of experience.
56. Steve Zeidman’s comparison of student-attorney and appointed counsel
outcomes and performance parallels much of my anecdotal experience. See, e.g.,
Zeidman, supra note 42, at 905 (stating that “guilty pleas in cases handled by
students reflect a higher percentage of charge reductions”).
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pushing for trials to get experience, when they should be telling
their clients to plead guilty because they are guilty. The narrative
here is that the pendulum has in effect swung from coercing clients
to plead guilty to coercing them to go to trial. These complaints
ignore that only the client—and not the student—can decide to go
to trial, and also refuse to acknowledge that some defendants
actually choose trial over plea when that option is made clearly
available to them. In fact, the pendulum has simply swung away
from explicit or implicit coercion to plead guilty toward
representation that allows defendants a truly knowing and
voluntary choice about how to best proceed.
The misdemeanor trial has almost disappeared in many
jurisdictions, with some high-volume courts gaining more than
99% of all misdemeanor convictions without trials.57 This is a
central part of the misdemeanor crisis, and has allowed the
current, overloaded lower courts to continue to function. The lack
of adjudication of public order offenses is also a large part of the
crisis in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, as the vast
majority of individuals who experience that system receive the
strong message that no institutional actor—judge, prosecutor, or
even their assigned defense attorney—is concerned with the
factual basis for a criminal charge or the legality of police conduct
leading up to an arrest.58
57. See, e.g., NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
5 (presenting New York City statistics).
58. As Roscoe Pound noted more than eighty years ago, and Malcolm
Feeley more recently reminded us:
It is [the handling of petty prosecutions] that the administration of
criminal justice touches immediately the greatest number of
people. . . . The bad physical surroundings, the confusion, the want of
decorum, the undignified offhand disposition of cases at high speed,
the frequent suggestion of something working behind the scenes,
which characterize the petty criminal court in almost all of our cities,
create in the minds of observers a general suspicion of the whole
process of law enforcement which, no matter how unfounded, gravely
prejudices the law.
MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 6 (1979) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 190−91 (1930)); see also Howell, supra note 8, at 274−75
(“Unfortunately for the criminal justice system and for the millions of people
subjected to summary arrest each year for minor and noncriminal ordermaintenance offenses, the processing of minor offenses bears few of the
hallmarks associated with perceptions of procedural fairness.”).
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III. Strategies for Focusing on Misdemeanors

So what might a coordinated effort to crash the misdemeanor
system look like? This section explores several strategies: a
defender community focus on order-maintenance misdemeanors,
meaning the petty, largely public-order-offense arrests that come
out of zero-tolerance policing;59 the creation of specialized practice
groups within a defender office for expertise and efficiency
purposes; defender office-wide policies to advance quality
misdemeanor representation, such as systems to collect
information about particular police officers who frequently make
petty offense arrests; and coordinated efforts to link focused petty
misdemeanor representation to other strategies, such as impact
litigation and community education, to move these cases out of the
criminal justice system. The ways in which a particular defender
office or group might choose to focus efforts on the lower criminal
courts will vary by jurisdiction, and these strategies thus offer
broad suggestions that may—or may not—be the right fit in a
particular jurisdiction.
A. Focusing on Public Order Offenses
The types of minor misdemeanor arrests that come out of
order-maintenance policing will vary by jurisdiction, but often
include prosecutions for trespass, disorderly conduct, public
urination or drunkenness, loitering, and marijuana possession.60
These cases are charged in significant numbers across the nation.
For example, in 2009 more than 45% of all drug arrests in the
United States were for marijuana possession;61 in that same year,
59. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (describing “zero
tolerance,” or “order-maintenance” policing).
60. See Bowers, supra note 11, at 1666 (noting that “[m]any of the cases in
the [lower] courts (perhaps the majority in most urban jurisdictions) are petty
public order cases”).
61. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States: Arrests
(Sept. 2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/arrests/index.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013) (depicting data about drug abuse violations throughout the United
States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This percentage
includes felony and misdemeanor marijuana possession, as the FBI does not
separate the two categories. Id.
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“there were 8,067 gambling arrests, 26,380 vagrancy arrests,
471,727 drunkenness arrests, 518,374 disorderly conduct arrests,
and 89,733 curfew and loitering arrests.”62
In trying fiscal times, these are the types of cases in which
proper representation—that impose the real cost of mass
misdemeanor processing—could put pressure on legislators to
decriminalize and prosecutors to decline to prosecute. Indeed, such
movement has already happened in some jurisdictions. Supporters
of the successful November 2012 ballot measures to legalize
personal marijuana possession and use in Colorado and
Washington stressed that “the laws will end thousands of smallscale drug arrests while freeing law enforcement to focus on larger
crimes” and “estimate[d] that taxing marijuana will bring in
millions of dollars of new revenue for governments, and will save
court systems and police departments additional millions.”63
Minor misdemeanors are also good candidates for the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion in declining to file charges. In California
in 2009, Sacramento and Contra Costa prosecutors announced
plans to stop prosecuting certain misdemeanors, including many
minor public order offenses, in the face of severe budget cuts.64 A
memo from the Sacramento District Attorney listed petty theft,
62. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States: Table
29 (Sept. 2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (listing numerical data about the number of arrests in
various categories in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR
LAW & POLICY, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS COULD SAVE $1
BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL 1
(2010) (“In some courts, the combination of [the three misdemeanors of] driving
with a suspended license, possession of marijuana, and minor in possession of
alcohol cases can total between 40% and 50% of the caseload.”).
63. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal
Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 94C, § 32L (2008) (decriminalizing marijuana); MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE
WASTE, supra note 1, at 28 (describing King County, Washington’s program for
diversion of driving-while-suspended cases). In this program, individuals
worked off underlying fines that led to suspension in exchange for dismissal of
the criminal charges. Id. The first months of the program showed a reduction of
eighty-four percent in prosecutorial filings in suspension cases and a reduction
of twenty-four percent in jail costs. Id.
64. See Jesse McKinley, Money Shortages Force Cuts in Cases to be
Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A13 (giving statements from the
Sacramento County District Attorney and Contra Costa County District
Attorney discussing plans to stop prosecuting certain minor crimes).
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public drunkenness, and minor drug possession as candidates for
declination, and “[d]istrict attorneys in many parts of the country
say they are considering prosecutorial rollbacks, including opting
not to try some minor crimes . . . and seeking to divert more
defendants to so-called community court systems.”65 While these
threats, obviously closely tied to efforts to retain funding,66 have
not often been carried out, such proposals highlight concerns with
the costs of the lower criminal courts and potential openness to
reform. This makes it an opportune time to focus defender
resources on the types of cases that legislators and prosecutors
might agree should be moved out of the system altogether, should
they prove too costly.
Currently, and counterintuitively, petty misdemeanors are
the types of charges least likely to get prosecutorial scrutiny.
Josh Bowers has analyzed data showing that:
Iowa prosecutors declined [to file charges in] public order
offenses at a substantially lower rate than any other offense
category . . . . Specifically, violent felonies and misdemeanors
were declined almost three times as often as public order
felonies and misdemeanors. And all felonies were declined over
fourteen times as often as all simple misdemeanors.67

Bowers found similar data in New York City, with the lowest
rates of declination of charges in public order offense cases.68 This
is likely due in part to the high volume of petty misdemeanors in
some jurisdictions, particularly busy urban courts, making it
difficult for lower court prosecutors to adequately screen such
cases. It is undoubtedly also due to the high percentage of “quickand-dirty pleas with minimal resource outlay” in petty
prosecutions, making the defender community complicit in the
continued movement of these cases.69 These are the cases most in
need of defense scrutiny and focus.
65. Id. (noting that the Contra Costa prosecutor eventually “cut his own
salary to avoid putting the plan in place”).
66. See, e.g., A.G. Sulzberger, Facing Cuts, a City Repeals Its Domestic
Violence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at A11 (describing how Topeka, Kansas
prosecutor “said he was forced to not prosecute any misdemeanors and to focus
on felonies because the County Commission cut his budget”).
67. Bowers, supra note 11, at 1716.
68. See id. at 1718.
69. See id. at 1716.
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Finally, public order offenses may be less controversial as a
focus of a coordinated defender community and defendant effort
than other types of offenses, because they are usually victimless.
They are generally malum prohibitum, or wrong only because the
law says so, and they are the result of discretionary arrests (as
compared to, say, a domestic violence arrest in a mandatoryarrest jurisdiction). When someone is arrested for such an
offense, it represents a deliberate choice of police resources (for
example, sending officers in to do a “vertical sweep” of a public
housing building, resulting in a number of trespass arrests).
There are a number of reasons to focus defender resources on
public order offenses in an attempt to encourage more defendants
to reject early guilty pleas and to go to trial. While it may seem
counterintuitive to use scarce resources on minor cases, there are
potential long-term benefits for all defendants and for society in
the rigorous defense of individuals charged with public order
offenses.
B. Specialized Misdemeanor Practice Groups
For purposes of expertise and efficiency, defender offices
might assign attorneys to particular categories of offense, for
example creating a “marijuana possession practice group” or a
“loitering practice group.” While this would require transferring
certain cases from the arraigning defense counsel to the practice
group counsel, thus moving away from vertical representation in
offices that use a vertical model, there would be substantial
advantages to a specialized group approach.70
Specialization would allow attorneys to quickly become
experts in constitutional, statutory, and evidentiary issues in the
particular type of case. As Justice Douglas noted in Argersinger v.
Hamlin:71

70. For attorney development reasons, and because an order-maintenance
misdemeanor focus would encompass only some cases in lower court, offices
might have only a certain amount of each attorney’s caseload in the specialized
area, with the remainder of cases more randomly assigned for diversity of
caseload.
71. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex
than when a person can be sent off for six months or more. The
trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only brief
sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often
bristle with thorny constitutional questions.72

Disorderly conduct cases raise potential free speech issues, and
trespass trials are replete with evidentiary and statutory issues,
as well as constitutional ones. For example, a recent clinic
trespass case led to the students’ preparation on the following:
whether the police officer could testify about prior notice of his
warning to the defendant to stay away from the location in the
case or instead whether the prosecution was required to produce
the written warning; whether a general warning to stay away
from a store encompassed the sidewalk in front of the store so as
to provide sufficient notice of trespass under the relevant statute;
and whether the prosecution could rely on testimony from either
the police officer or an agent for a strip mall to prove that the
officer had the statutorily required authority to arrest for
trespassing at a privately rented store within the strip mall.
Garnering such expertise for future cases allows defense counsel
to properly challenge unlawful arrests, to hold the prosecution to
its burden, and to offer clients the option of a trial with several
potential lines of defense.
Specialization is a more efficient use of defender time, as
issues tend to repeat themselves within particular categories of
cases. Such efficiency has the added benefit of giving attorneys
more time for the type of client counseling that must be central to
an approach that stresses trial rights over guilty pleas and
encourages clients to seriously consider refusing guilty pleas in
appropriate cases.
C. Office-Wide Policies to Advance Quality Lower Court
Representation
Some strategies for working towards more minor
misdemeanor trials, or at least fewer guilty pleas, will cut across
72.

Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
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all types of cases. For example, defenders should refrain from
advising unincarcerated clients to accept plea bargains at the
first court appearance, on the grounds that such guilty pleas
violate professional and ethical standards requiring investigation
in all criminal cases.73 Defense counsel has a clear duty to inform
clients about any plea offers,74 and clients are free to enter a
guilty plea at the first appearance should they so choose,75 but
counsel should also make each client fully aware of the
consequences of any plea and the option of rejecting an early plea
with the goal of trial or of a later, potentially more advantageous,
disposition.76 This would include clearly informing clients about
the myriad formal and informal collateral consequences of even a
minor misdemeanor conviction,77 thus giving the client true
knowledge about the consequences of a quick guilty plea and the
benefits to fighting the charges.
Giving individuals facing misdemeanor charges a real
opportunity for voluntary decision-making about going to trial
recognizes that the current misdemeanor system is replete with
coercion points, pushing defendants towards quick, uninformed
73. Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the
Prosecution, 32 FORD. URB. L.J. 315, 331 n.86 (2005) (“Pleas at arraignments fly
directly in the face of the lawyer’s constitutional and ethical duty to
investigate.” (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-4.1, 4-6.1 (1980))); see also Norman L.
Reimer, Frye and Lafler: Much Ado About What We Do—And What Prosecutors
and Judges Should Not Do, 36 APR CHAMPION 7, 8 (2012) (critiquing “meet ’em
and plead ’em” practices); NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 17, at 29 (noting that almost half of all New York City misdemeanors are
resolved at arraignment).
74. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (finding a Sixth
Amendment duty to communicate formal plea offers to client).
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) (“In a criminal
case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered. . . .”); AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Std. 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993) (“Certain decisions relating to the
conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for
defense counsel.”). The decisions to be made by the accused, after full
consultation with counsel, include: “(i) what pleas to enter; (ii) whether to accept
a plea agreement.” Id.
76. See Zeidman, supra note 42, at 867–82 (describing how clinic clients
who declined to plead guilty early in the case often received dismissals or better
offers at a later point).
77. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 297−303 (describing minor convictions
that lead to major collateral consequences).
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guilty pleas. Defense counsel has an obligation to counter these
coercion points. That countering can come in a variety of forms,
such as assuring the client that counsel is fully prepared to try
the case, rather than suggesting that a guilty plea is “better”
when that suggestion is at least partly based on counsel’s own
triage concerns. Only in this way can defenders achieve truly
client-centered misdemeanor representation, namely by giving
individuals the tools and assistance they need to avoid minor
convictions with major consequences. When Michelle Alexander,
in her Crash the System editorial, wrote that “mass incarceration
depends almost entirely on the cooperation of those it seeks to
control,” the cooperation she was critiquing came in the form of
guilty pleas taken under circumstances that can hardly be
defined as knowing and voluntary.78 In the lower criminal courts,
this means clients trying to talk to counsel for the first time in
the hallway as counsel runs between courtrooms, and having an
“offer” to plead guilty pushed forward when the client does not
trust counsel enough to discuss fears of deportation, loss of the
family’s public housing, or potential plans for college next year
that depend on an ability to get financial aid. Refusing to
encourage, and indeed generally discouraging, guilty pleas at the
first appearance is a seemingly small step that will go a long way
to dissipating some of this coercion.
Defender offices, as some already do, should develop systems
to collect and make internally available information about police
officers focused on quality-of-life arrests, in order to see patterns
and more easily expose “testilying.”79 This is particularly
important in public order offenses, in which police testimony is
usually the only evidence. Such systems offer significant potential
benefits to lower court practice because discovery is often meager
and late. Even in “open file” discovery jurisdictions, prosecutors
may not have relevant police or laboratory reports—and may
78. Alexander, supra note 20, at SR 5.
79. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835,
836 (2008) (“In New York, the Mollen Commission found that perjury was ‘so
common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: ‘testilying.’’”
(quoting COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF N.Y., COMMISSION
REPORT 36 (1994) (Milton Mollen (Chair) and citing Joe Sexton, New York Police
Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at A1)).
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claim that they do not have time to get them—before the trial
date. The result is that many defendants plead guilty before
getting any discovery, including any potential exculpatory
material.80 Internal defender systems that expose patterns of
improper police conduct could lead to use of such evidence at trial
or in pretrial advocacy; the negative repercussions of public
exposure of such evidence might encourage more careful
prosecutorial analysis of public order cases and better decisionmaking by police officers in forwarding such cases to
prosecutors.81 Further, demanding discovery and following up on
those demands in minor misdemeanor cases could significantly
advance lower court practice norms, thus imposing more of the
true costs of mass misdemeanor processing on the criminal
justice system.
D. Supplementing Defender Focus on Misdemeanors with Other
Strategies for Reform of the Lower Criminal Courts
In order to force change in the lower courts, this Article’s
proposal of a trial-level focus on minor misdemeanor
representation should be supplemented with other strategies.
These might include: impact litigation to challenge particular
offenses or particular police practices, such as the Bronx trespass
litigation described above;82 impact litigation to challenge
80. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”); see
also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (holding that defendants have no
due process right to impeachment information about government witnesses
prior to entering a guilty plea, but leaving open the question of whether there is
such a right for nonimpeachment exculpatory evidence).
81. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing Bronx
District Attorney’s institution of more rigorous screening of trespass arrests
after defense bar complained about improper police conduct in such arrests).
82. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing recent trends
in trespass arrests made by the New York City Police Department); see also
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting preliminary
injunction against enforcement of unlicensed general vending misdemeanor as
applied to visual artists exhibiting or selling their work in public places);
Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics, supra note 51, at 363
(describing the Pace Law School criminal defense “Clinic’s experience leveraging
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inadequate indigent defender systems;83 decriminalization efforts,
which might be nudged along by higher costs that a defense
community trial-level focus would impose on the system; media
advocacy; and community education.84 Indeed, these other
strategies are critical for change in the lower criminal courts and
this Article’s proposal is not intended to stand on its own. The
proposal of focusing defender resources on petty misdemeanors is,
however, a critical component of reforming the lower courts—and
one that not only is missing with the current dismal state of
representation in many misdemeanor cases, but is ignored as a
viable method of helping to solve the misdemeanor crisis.
IV. A Different Conception of Triage: In Favor of Minor
Misdemeanors
There is little disagreement that indigent defense providers
face overwhelming workloads, and that this has a severely
negative effect on their clients.85 There is a body of literature that
works from the assumption that high workloads are here to stay
[its] misdemeanor docket to work towards ending the pattern of wrongful
trespass arrests in New York City,” and noting that the clinic’s “work involved a
combination of litigation strategies in Criminal Court, impact litigation, and
legislative advocacy”).
83. See Cara Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation,
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 440−75 (2009) (discussing suits raising
systemic challenges to indigent defense systems); see also Martin Guggenheim,
The People’s Right to a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 400 (2012) (“Separation of powers, which has long been a
shield preventing courts from overseeing indigent defender systems, is instead a
sword by which courts are authorized to decide for themselves whether indigent
defender systems are adequate to allow courts to perform their constitutionallyassigned function.”).
84. See MELANCA CLARK & EMILY SAVNER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
COMMUNITY ORIENTED DEFENSE: STRONGER PUBLIC DEFENDERS 7 (2010),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/community_
oriented_defender_network (“The Brennan Center founded the Community
Oriented Defender (COD) Network to support defenders and their allies who
seek more effective ways to carry out the defense function.”). “Our goal is to
enable defense counsel to engage community based institutions in order to
reduce unnecessary contact between individuals and the criminal justice
system.” Id.
85. See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 38 (detailing the
crisis in indigent defense systems across United States).
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and in need of a rational response—namely, a principled system
of triage.86 Arguments in favor of a system of triage that
diminishes representation for minor misdemeanors are,
effectively, arguments to shrink Gideon.87 Focusing on
misdemeanor representation, with the goal of fewer guilty pleas
and more trials so as to impose the true cost of mass
misdemeanor processing, is an attempt to shrink the overloaded,
unjust lower criminal courts.
A. The Debate over Public Defender Triage
As Darryl Brown has explained his view, the courts establish
and define the constitutional entitlement of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel, and the legislature then
underfunds indigent defense so that the entitlement cannot be
realized.88 These “[f]unding decisions, in effect, delegate to trial
attorneys and judges the job of rationing rights. That is, these
actors have the job of choosing which of the formal entitlements
courts have created will see practical implementation, and in
which cases.”89 Critiquing as unrealistic an approach that calls
for “uncompromising zealous advoca[cy]” for all criminal
defendants,90 those calling for triage instead find a stark reality:
“The choice in underfunded systems is not between zealous
advocacy and rights rationing. It is between haphazard, ad hoc
rationing and thoughtful, well-conceived allocation.”91
86. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Essay, Rationing Criminal Defense
Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801,
807 (2004) (describing the likelihood that high workloads will be persistent and
responding that a principled system of triage would be a rational answer).
87. See infra Parts IV.A.1−3 (describing various triage proposals that
essentially result in less misdemeanor representation).
88. See Brown, supra note 86, at 807.
89. Id. The triage idea builds on the important work of William Stuntz. See
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (explaining that legislatures limit
defense funding in part as a response to judicial overregulation of the criminal
justice system and that “[u]nderfunding of criminal defense counsel limits the
number of procedural claims that can be pressed”).
90. Brown, supra note 86, at 821 n.72 (citing MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 65–86 (1990)).
91. Id. at 828; see also id. at 808 (“[U]nderfunding of criminal defense is, in
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If one accepts that defenders must (and will) ration
resources, and that a principled system for doing so is preferable
to an ad-hoc response, the next step is determining the
principles for rationing.92 Scholars have offered different
effect, a permanent feature of American criminal justice.”); Erica J. Hashimoto,
The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 475
(2007) [hereinafter Hashimoto, The Price] (“[T]hat indigent defense counsel
caseloads are unacceptably high and that the quality of representation will
continue to suffer until those caseloads become more manageable—are
relatively uncontroversial.”). But see Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the
Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a
Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 936 (2010) (commenting that
Brown’s “proposal, even if logically justifiable and plausible as a professional
goal of public defenders, can provide no practical guidance that would
meaningfully offset inadequate resources”). “Moreover, the apparent promise for
more efficient allocation of resources can undermine arguments for adequate
defense funding by suggesting that the priority cases can be defended well only
if defenders focus their efforts on clearly observable pretrial indicators of likely
innocence.” Id. Another approach to rationing is based on the belief that “hardly
anyone in the society would want to devote the resources needed to bring us
even close to a state in which rights could be generally enforced.” William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1988);
see also id. at 1093 (“[T]he prevailing approaches to legal ethics should be
faulted, not for failing to guarantee full access to the legal system, but for failing
to contribute to an appropriate distribution of this necessarily scarce resource.”).
Monroe Freedman and others have critiqued Simon’s views, although discussion
of that lively debate is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Monroe H.
Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers’ Ethics, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 91, 91 (2012) [hereinafter Freedman, A Critique] (discussing the author’s
disagreement with Simon’s views).
92. The literature on criminal defense triage builds on a well-developed
body of work examining triage in the civil poverty law context. For example,
Paul Tremblay has suggested principles for screening potential clients in his
examination of the ethics of legal services triage that include: “legal success”
(when resources can make a difference); “conservation” (cases requiring
“proportionally smaller amounts” of the law office’s benefits to succeed);
“collective benefit” (cases likely to affect a large number of people); “attending to
the most serious legal matters” (when representation can ameliorate great
“pain, discomfort, or harm” of a client); and “long-term benefit over short-term
relief” (as a subset of the seriousness principle). Paul R. Tremblay, Acting “A
Very Moral Type of God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475,
2490−92 (1999); see also Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A
Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 281, 360−63 (1982) (discussing rationing
principles); Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1529, 1536−42 (1995) (same); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a CommunityBased Ethic for Legal Service Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1103 n.7 (1990)
(“Scarcity is inherent in legal services work. . . . [T]he presence of any fixed
budget inevitably creates allocation choices, and without the usual market or
price mechanisms some allocation methodology must be used.”). This civil
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models,93 falling into three general categories: innocence- and
stakes-based triage; a multicategory approach that takes
innocence, “seriousness of case,” and protection of the justice
system into account; and a straightforward “seriousness of case”
triage. A fourth category offers an ethical justification—that
includes a pragmatic proposal—for refusing to triage.
1. Innocence- and Stakes-Based Triage
Brown’s triage approach “urges factual innocence as a
predominant concern of criminal procedure over other competing
goals, such as regulation of police conduct.”94 This approach is
unapologetic in denying effective representation to some in order
to provide it to others. For example, a busy defender with two
clients—one with a suppression motion with merit and the other
“more likely to be innocent”—would forgo the motion in favor of
concentrating scarce resources on the potentially innocent client,
“even if the latter’s chances of ultimate success are lower.”95
poverty law literature builds, in turn, on philosophical debates over ethical
decision-making in situations of crisis or scarcity. See, e.g., HUGO ADAM BEDAU,
MAKING MORTAL CHOICES 5–37 (1997) (outlining the ethical problems and
questions related to resource scarcity); EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION:
RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW 71 (1981) (same). Recognizing
this important foundational work, this Article focuses on the criminal defense
triage literature.
93. See e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding
Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2013) (“[W]e must
shrink the universe of cases covered by Gideon to preserve its core. That would
mean excluding nonjury misdemeanors and perhaps probationary sentences
from its ambit.”); Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real about Gideon: The Next Fifty
Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1336
(2013) (stating “[b]udget constraints and excessive caseloads have made triage
an essential component of modern public defense”).
94. Brown, supra note 86, at 808 (noting that “[t]he specifics of [his
proposed rationing] approach adapt insights from recent research on the causes
of wrongful convictions”). Brown acknowledges that “[t]here are certainly
jurisdictions in which funding levels are so low that rationing cannot be done in
any meaningful manner; there simply is not enough to ration.” Id. at 815
(describing Quitman County, Mississippi). His triage proposal would also not
apply where there is “adequate funding of some locales that calls merely for
ordinary lawyering decisions about allocation of resources.” Id. at 816. His
approach would apply only in the “large middle range.” Id.
95. Id. at 821. One might question Brown’s statement that “[b]eyond its
intuitive normative appeal, an approach giving priority to factual innocence
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In addition to factual innocence, Brown would ration in favor
of “charges and clients who have the most at stake or are likely to
gain the greatest life benefit.”96 The “most at stake” principle
means restricting Argersinger rights—namely, the right to
counsel in misdemeanor cases in which the defendant is
sentenced to actual or suspended incarceration97—to “the extent
necessary to make Gideon more meaningful.”98 In other words,
the large majority of individuals facing criminal charges, those
facing low-level offenses, “get deliberately poorer representation
and thus face a greater likelihood of conviction and punishment
than they otherwise would.”99 Tempering this seemingly bright
line between what he describes as high- and low-stakes cases,
Brown notes how in some instances a defender might devote more
resources to an individual facing minor charges but with a good
chance of acquittal or lower sentence.100 This, however, is an

draws its legitimacy from both core constitutional values and its correlation
with plausible assumptions about legislative preferences.” Id. at 817. While it is
true that language in some of the major right-to-counsel cases—including
Powell v. Alabama, Gideon, and the Argersinger line of cases—defines the core
role of defense counsel as protecting innocent clients against wrongful
incarceration, later cases such as Padilla v. Kentucky, Lafler v. Cooper, and
Missouri v. Frye offer a different conception of defense counsel, namely one that
focuses on effective representation relating to guilty pleas. See Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2012) (stating that “negotiation of a plea
bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel.”); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406
(2012) (same); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (“During plea
negotiations defendants are ‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent
counsel.’” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))). In
addition, ethical rules binding defense lawyers require zealous advocacy for all
clients, not only those clients “likely to be innocent,” and professional standards
similarly conceive defense counsel as attuned to the client’s needs and goals,
irrespective of guilt or innocence. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 83 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing interpretation of
zealous representation norm in Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
96. Brown, supra note 86, at 818.
97. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (holding that it violates
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to imprison a person for any uncounseled
conviction, absent a valid waiver of the right); see also supra note 45 and
accompanying text (citing post-Argersinger cases).
98. Brown, supra note 86, at 818.
99. Id. (“Rationing defense services means a higher risk of error in some
cases, and that risk should be allocated toward parties with less to lose.”).
100. See id. at 818–19 (“It is often better to put resources toward a project
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exception to a rule of rationing that would generally give priority
to clients facing more serious charges.
Brown is not naïve about the potential pitfalls of having
public defenders—who are overwhelmed and hampered by
cognitive biases—making quick, early decisions about their
clients’ potential innocence.101 Still, he would prefer even such
potentially flawed decision-making to a completely ad hoc
method. One critical omission from Brown’s examination of
potential pitfalls in his triage proposal is that these practical and
cognitive obstacles to determining innocence are exaggerated in
misdemeanor representation. Defense counsel in the lower
criminal courts have higher caseloads than their felony
counterparts, and less access to external information through
discovery. A large percentage of misdemeanor cases (such as drug
cases or public order offenses) rest solely on the word of law
enforcement, making the likelihood of a cognitive bias in favor of
the police in a “client said, police said” type of case particularly
high, even by defense counsel. In the lower courts, there is almost
no time to step back and carefully review the case for likely
innocence, and the pressure of the context may exacerbate
already strong cognitive biases.102
with a high chance of reducing small harms than a small chance of preventing a
great harm.”).
101. See id. at 826–27 (discussing various cognitive biases that likely affect
attorneys making resource allocation judgments, but remaining convinced that
the innocence basis for rationing is still defensible). A major problem with
Brown’s proposed triage system is that it expects defense counsel to somehow
sort through and separate out the likely innocent clients from the guilty clients.
See id. at 816. First, how will defense counsel who has more clients than she can
effectively handle do this sorting? Surely it should not be based on gut instinct,
but often—and particularly in jurisdictions where there is restrictive discovery
so that defense counsel has little information at the inception of the case—that
is largely what defense counsel has to work with. Brown notes this chicken-andegg problem with his triage proposal. See id. (discussing the application of his
proposal). Indeed, although he finds that in the end defense counsel is up to the
task of sorting likely innocent from likely guilty clients early in the case, his
critique is so strong as to be a convincing argument against his proposed system
of evidence-based triage. See id. at 820 (“All of these are complicated judgments
to be sure, and in practice will sometimes be made quite roughly. But they are
not different in kind from the judgments defense attorneys have long made
when faced with resource constraints . . . .”).
102. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).

1120

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013)

2. Multicategory Triage Approach (with a Focus on Innocence)
John Mitchell, in an early ethical and philosophical inquiry,
noted how despite various theories of the role of defense counsel
in the lower criminal courts, “the defender’s work is better
described by the medical/disaster theory of allocation in chaos—
triage.”103 Mitchell’s view is that the need to triage does not
necessarily lead to violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.104 Instead, he suggests that defense counsel divide
misdemeanor cases into those requiring “focus,” and those in
which only “pattern representation” is needed, both meeting the
constitutional floor.105
Mitchell proposes one catch-all and two specific categories of
cases in which clients would get “focused representation,”
meaning zealous representation that meets ethical and
professional standards above the bare minimum required by the
Sixth Amendment: (1) serious cases, meaning first priority to “the
factually innocent” and secondary priority to individuals “facing
extreme sentences or collateral legal consequences”; (2) “cases
implicating system protection,” for example, cases presenting
issues of “legally insufficient evidence, determinative evidentiary
or procedural issues, [and] clear overcharging”; and (3) the catchall of “concrete injustice,” which Mitchell describes as “cases that
touch the heart and gut,” using the example of a pregnant client
trying to clean up her life (so long as this category is rarely used

103. John Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1215, 1225 (1994). Mitchell’s article
considers four central, recurring principles for making rationing
decisions as potential tools for developing a rationing regime for
defenders in the lower courts. It then analyzes each to determine
what guidance each can provide for allocating our scarce resource of
focus in the lower criminal courts. The four principles are as follows:
1. Greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarianism); 2. Help
those with the greatest need (egalitarianism); 3. Queues, randomness
(egalitarianism); 4. Let the market decide (merit).
Id. at 1252.
104. See id. at 1245–46 (“To avoid misunderstanding, one should recognize
that this latter approach (pattern representation) is one which, as will be
explained later, fulfills the Sixth Amendment and frequently leads to favorable
results for the client.”).
105. Id. at 1246–48; see also id. at 1245–46.
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and the attorney using it “continues to sincerely examine and
question her cultural biases.”).106
Significantly, and relevant to this Article’s proposal, Mitchell
notes how “focused representation” in the categories of cases he
identifies will result in changes in prosecutorial behavior:
Legal-insufficiency cases and most factual-innocence ones will
drop out as prosecutors begin to respond to defenders’
willingness to push those cases and their general success when
they do. This in turn may well lead the prosecutor to more
carefully screen cases at the inception and not even charge
such cases in the first place, as well as not overcharge.107

While this is an important benefit of “focused representation,”
Mitchell’s description of the “pattern representation” that most
lower court defendants would receive gives one pause: “‘Pattern
representation’ means quickly categorizing cases legally,
factually, strategically, and predictively by corresponding certain
salient features of a case to recurring patterns the defender has
abstracted from the masses of cases in which all fellow defenders
have been involved.”108 As Monroe Freedman has noted, this
description is “strikingly similar to the inquisitorial system of
judging.”109

106. Id. at 1288–90; cf. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justification:
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1278
(1993) (“A[] potential danger of empathy is that it can lead to problematic
allocation of resources. . . . In a situation of extremely limited attorney
resources, . . . [t]he time that I spend getting to know my clients, listening to
their stories, helping them find jobs, is time that I could spend representing
others.”).
107. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 1291.
108. Id. at 1293.
109. Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 911, 915 (2005) [hereinafter Freedman, Ethical Manifesto]
(describing Fuller’s critique of the “pattern approach” used in inquisitorial
systems and his view that an “adversarial presentation . . . [is] ‘the only effective
means for combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms
of the familiar that which is not yet known’” (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The
Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold J. Berman ed.,
1971))).
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3. Triage Based on Case Seriousness: Cutting Back on
Misdemeanor Representation

A very different method of rationing is simply to deny
counsel to a subset of individuals charged with misdemeanors on
the theory that we can identify types of cases in which defense
counsel does not provide any benefit to the individual. Like
Mitchell and Brown, Erica Hashimoto offers a solution to her
foundational observation that “[o]utrageously excessive caseloads
have
compromised
the
quality
of
indigent
defense
representation.”110 Criticizing jurisdictions that “force counsel to
direct significant attention to low-level misdemeanor cases,”111
Hashimoto presents data supporting her claim that appointed
counsel “do not appear to provide significant benefit to the[se]
defendants;” she thus focuses on “ways in which a state could
limit appointment in those cases.”112
Hashimoto examined misdemeanors in federal court from
2000 to 2005 and found that pro se defendants—some 64% of the
misdemeanor defendants in the data—were much less likely than
represented defendants to enter a guilty plea and much more
likely to get a dismissal or an acquittal in a bench trial.113 This
data also revealed that pro se defendants fared significantly
better than represented defendants in sentencing outcomes.114
Hashimoto acknowledges limitations in her data, for example
noting that federal court misdemeanor outcomes may not
accurately predict state court misdemeanor outcomes, and that
the relatively low numbers of pro se defendants in federal
misdemeanor proceedings may lead “federal judges [to] make

110. Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 464.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 465.
113. Id. at 490 tbl.2.
114. Id. at 491. In a related study examining state court felonies, Hashimoto
found that “at the state court level, felony defendants representing themselves
at the time their cases were terminated appear to have achieved higher felony
acquittal rates than their represented counterparts in that they were less likely
to have been convicted of felonies.” Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of
Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C.
L. REV. 423, 428 (2007).
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more accommodations to ensure that the rights of those
defendants are protected.”115
Working from this admittedly limited data, Hashimoto
proposes “four steps that states can take to limit appointment of
counsel to those cases in which the need for appointment is most
justified”:
First, states that currently provide a statutory right to counsel
in all misdemeanor cases—regardless of penalty—should
amend their statutes so that the defendant’s statutory right to
counsel mirrors the federal constitutional right to counsel.
Second, states should modify penalties for some minor offenses
so that those offenses do not give rise to a right to counsel.
Third, states should alter the structure of probation so that
the imposition of a probationary sentence does not give rise to
a right to counsel. Finally, states should establish procedures
so that determinations regarding potential sentences in
misdemeanor cases are made at the outset of the case.116

Pointing out how these steps will lead to fewer clients for
indigent defense providers, Hashimoto importantly urges states
to adopt specific, numerical caseload limitations so that decreased
case numbers actually lead to lower defense workloads.117
Hashimoto’s proposal gives short shrift to the collateral
consequences of misdemeanor convictions. She notes how
misdemeanor convictions can lead to sentence enhancement in a
later case and possible immigration consequences for noncitizens,
but states that “all of these consequences, in addition to a loss of
liberty, are threatened in more serious cases. To the extent that a
115. See Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 494; see also id. at 495
(noting how defendants with weak or minor charges against them may be less
likely to retain or request appointed counsel).
116. Id. at 467, 497–503.
117. Id. at 467, 504–13 (discussing recommendations to states regarding
caseload limitations). Hashimoto claims that “[t]wo factors—the rise in total
number of cases requiring appointment of counsel and the inadequacy of
indigent defense budgets—have led to the current caseload crisis.” Id. at 475.
Although she briefly notes the recent exponential growth in cases prosecuted in
state and local courts, see id. at 481–82 (describing a “sharp rise in the number
of narcotics prosecutions” and “increases in misdemeanor prosecutions”), she
focuses on—and appears to place responsibility for—the rise in numbers of cases
requiring counsel largely on Gideon, and more specifically on Gideon’s extension
to some misdemeanor prosecutions in the Argersinger line of cases. See id. at
468–81; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Argersinger
line of cases).
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resource-allocation choice must be made, the resources should go
to those charged with offenses that will lead to imprisonment in
the event of conviction.”118 But imprisonment is not always a
proxy for seriousness of the consequence. Many minor criminal
charges can lead to major collateral consequences that require
counseling and advocacy. We might decide, for example, that
counsel plays a more critical role in representing an elderly, longterm permanent resident noncitizen who faces deportation if
convicted of his first offense for shoplifting (even if a jail sentence
is off the table) than for a young person facing felony drug
charges in a jurisdiction where he will be eligible for—and
offered—a preplea diversionary program leading to dismissal of
the charges upon successful completion (even if imprisonment is a
theoretical possibility). Despite failing to fully account for
collateral consequences, Hashimoto offers a provocative proposal
based on an important, albeit limited, empirical inquiry.
4. Refusing to Triage
Monroe Freedman, in a strong critique of the triagists’
argument that public defenders in many jurisdictions cannot
zealously represent all of their clients, proposes an alternative
response to triage: defenders should refuse to take on further
clients.119 To do this, counsel should enlist supervisory assistance,
and make a record that the basis for the refusal is the defender’s
inability to deliver zealous representation (which entails the type
of initial fact investigation that pattern representation
forecloses).120
This refusal to triage is consistent with Freedman’s position,
along with co-author Abbe Smith in their important book,
Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics, that “zealousness continues
today to be the fundamental principle of the law of lawyering and

118. Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 498 n.48.
119. See Freedman, Ethical Manifesto, supra note 109, at 920 (“In order to
allow zealous investigation and research, defense counsel is forbidden to carry a
workload that interferes with this minimum standard of competence, or one that
might lead to the breach of other professional obligations.”).
120. Id. at 921–22.
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the dominant standard of lawyerly excellence.”121 Indeed, in his
critique of proposals for utilitarian triage in misdemeanor cases,
Freedman has noted that “by honoring their ethical obligations,
public defenders would cease to be an essential part of a
fraudulent cover-up of the denial of fundamental rights to
countless poor people who are caught up in a criminal justice
system that is unethical, unconstitutional, and intolerably
cruel.”122
B. Shrinking Mass Misdemeanor Processing, Not Gideon
In the literature on triage in criminal defense practice,
individuals charged with minor misdemeanors are the losers.
Under all of the triagists’ models for response to overload, the
“small” case, which they describe as generally without significant
consequences,123 does not merit much, if anything, in the way of
defender resources. There is not enough to go around, something
has to give, and individuals facing minor charges in the lower
121. FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 95,
at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). Noting the “tepid endorsement of
zealous representation” in the current version of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, Freedman and Smith find “reason to believe” that these rules “will be
interpreted to include the pervasive obligation of zealous representation.” Id. at
83; see also Freedman, A Critique, supra note 91, at 91.
122. Freedman, Ethical Manifesto, supra note 109, at 923. Indeed, defenders
in a number of jurisdictions, including Miami-Dade County, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, Maryland, Arizona, and Tennessee, have cited their
professional and constitutional duty to provide effective assistance in turning
down assignments to handle more cases or suing to reduce excessive caseloads.
See, e.g., State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(certifying public defender office’s claim of conflict-of-interest arising from
excessive caseloads to Florida Supreme Court); State ex rel. Missouri Pub.
Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 612 (Mo. 2012) (holding that trial
court exceeded its authority in appointing public defender to represent
defendant after public defender declined additional representation because it
had exceeded its caseload capacity); Jeff Adachi, Budget Cuts Threaten Promise
of Equal Justice, RECORDER, Feb. 13, 2009 (listing other jurisdictions), available
at http://sfpublicdefender.org/2009/04/21/budget-cuts-threaten-promise-of-equaljustice.
123. To be fair, Mitchell (and to a very limited extent, Hashimoto) does note
the potential for serious collateral consequences of minor criminal convictions.
See Mitchell, supra note 103, at 1274 (discussing major collateral consequences);
Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 498 n.148 (discussing the potential
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction (citations omitted)).
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criminal courts—and most defendants in the criminal justice
system are in the lower criminal courts—get the short end of the
resource stick.
The problem with this approach is that it allows these
seemingly minor cases to continue to move through the criminal
justice system. Defense counsel, by failing to devote sufficient
resources, in effect enhances the ability of legislators, police, and
prosecutors to continue creating, arresting for, and prosecuting
crimes that many might agree do not even belong in the criminal
justice system.124 The criminal defense bar has a particular role
to play in forcing the hand of these other institutional actors. By
neglecting the least serious types of cases, at least as judged by
the likely outcome in the criminal court, defenders also fail to
challenge the legitimacy of these types of prosecutions. Defenders
can help clients—often by simply offering representation that
gives clients a true choice to reject a quick guilty plea—push the
boundaries of the system, so that it can no longer handle the
volume of misdemeanors currently flowing through.
There is also no longer such a thing as a “slap on the wrist.”
All convictions, even for the most minor of charges, come with a
long list of “collateral consequences,”125 ranging from the loss of
public housing and federal student loans to the inability to find
work because the majority of employers now run criminal
background checks on prospective employees.126 Indeed, in his
124. See, e.g., supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing recent ballot
initiatives in Colorado and Washington decriminalizing marijuana).
125. Collateral consequences are the “wide range of status-related penalties
that are permitted or required by law because of a conviction even if not
included in the court’s judgment.” MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS &
CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW,
POLICY & PRACTICE 16 (2013); see also id. (recognizing that “[t]here is no
consensus about how the term ‘collateral’ should be defined or about the legal
implications of such a label”).
126. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006) (listing varying ineligibility
periods for federal student loans, based on number of drug-related convictions);
42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2006) (bars to public housing); see also SOC’Y FOR HUMAN
RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
CHECKS 3 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/
Articles/Pages/BackgroundCheckCriminalChecks.aspx (noting that 73% of
organizations surveyed conduct criminal background checks for all job
candidates); cf. THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 131−34 (Nov.
5, 2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_transition2009.pdf
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1970 Argersinger concurrence, Justice Powell noted that “the
effect of a criminal record on employability . . . [is] frequently of
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label
‘petty.’”127 He pointed out that “[s]erious consequences also may
result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma
may attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade. Losing one’s driver’s license is more serious for some
individuals than a brief stay in jail.”128
It is one thing to say that an individual pleading guilty to
disorderly conduct does not necessarily need counsel to be
assured a nonjail sentence. It is quite another to say that
individual does not need counsel to understand that she will lose
her public-school-system job and her public housing if she pleads
guilty.129 Similarly, it is one thing to say a person does not need a
lawyer to keep him out of jail on a public urination case. It is
quite another to say he does not need serious counseling, from his
own lawyer, about how, if he is in California, pleading guilty to
public urination leads to lifelong sex offender registration.130
(recommending various executive and legislative changes to deal with bars to
employment for individuals with criminal records).
127. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
128. Id. “When the deprivation of property rights and interest is of sufficient
consequence, denying the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of
defending themselves is a denial of due process.” Id.
129. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (discussing collateral
consequences associated with misdemeanors).
130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(b)–(c) (West 2012) (“Every person described
in subdivision (c), for the rest of his or her life while residing in California . . .
shall be required to register . . . in accordance with the [Sex Offender
Registration] Act. The following persons shall be required to register: . . .
[persons convicted under] subdivision 1 or 2 of Section 314 . . . .”); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 314(1) (West 2012) (“Every person who willfully and lewdly, either:
Exposes his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any
place where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed
thereby . . . [is guilty of a misdemeanor].”).
In more than a decade of practicing and supervising lawyers and students
in several different lower criminal courts, I have seen some defendants take
guilty pleas without counsel that are the same as they likely would have gotten
with counsel. I have seen judges impose sentences for unrepresented defendants
that are the same as that person would have gotten with counsel. (Although
certainly not always; I have also seen prosecutors “offer” unrepresented
individuals a plea to the minor charge, when they will offer represented
defendants a diversionary program). I have not, however, seen many
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These are only a few brief examples; legislators continue to add to
the lengthy list of collateral consequences of criminal convictions
at the federal, state, and local level.131
C. Arguments Against Defender Focus on Minor Misdemeanors
(and Responses)
This Part flags and briefly discusses the major arguments
against a defender focus on minor misdemeanor cases. One
response to all of these concerns is that any coordinated effort to
“crash” or put pressure on the misdemeanor system must be
locally tailored, and attempted only in certain jurisdictions.
1. What Will Give?
The most significant critique of misdemeanor-focused triage
will be: what will give, if defenders focus on misdemeanor cases—
and in particular on minor, quality-of-life offenses in the lower
courts? Do defenders short-shrift clients charged with serious
felonies? With serious misdemeanors? Put fewer resources into
capital cases?
First, any triage in favor of misdemeanors would, ideally, be
short-lived. It would not take long for the system to feel the cost
of mass misdemeanor processing if defense counsel is no longer
helping to coerce guilty pleas. Another way to mitigate the cost of
focusing on minor misdemeanors is for public defenders to enlist
outside assistance. Law school clinical programs might coordinate
with public defenders in a time-limited, intensive focus on a
particular group of cases.132 Coordination with law firms is
another possibility. I have had a number of former criminal
defense clinic students head off to large law firms with the hope
of doing pro bono criminal defense work. I tell them that while
unrepresented defendants go to trial in misdemeanor cases; rather,
unrepresented individuals take early, quick guilty pleas.
131. See generally National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, supra note 2 (cataloguing collateral consequences in different
jurisdictions).
132. Cf. supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing clinic involvement
in criminal trespass cases).
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they should work to create such opportunities, most firms’ pro
bono dockets do not include much trial-level representation,
particularly not in the lower criminal courts. While there are
many reasons firms might focus pro bono criminal law work on
death penalty or other high-stakes appeals, law firms could also
commit to misdemeanor representation. New attorneys with no
exposure to criminal court should not simply step in to handle a
case or two on their own, but many clinic professors would feel
comfortable having former students handle a small number of
minor misdemeanor charges pro bono, particularly if the firm was
providing training and had connections with local practitioners,
and particularly as part of a coordinated strategy focusing on a
specific group of low-level offenses.
Second, the need for crashing the system is not unique to the
lower court context. One could certainly apply many of the same
arguments to felony cases, and in particular to the large number
of drug cases prosecuted. This Article’s specific focus is on the
lower criminal courts, the pressing need for change at an
opportune moment when states are fiscally strapped, and one
way to advance such change.
2. Trying to “Crash” the Misdemeanor System May Backfire
Will misdemeanor lawyers willing to try cases—and their
clients—suffer as a result of the attorney’s refusal to “meet ’em
and plead ’em” and follow other such troubling aspects of regular
lower court life? Prosecutors may respond to a coordinated effort
to give clients the true option of going to trial in minor
misdemeanors by seeking more punitive sentences in such cases,
refusing to offer diversionary programs, and encouraging police
officers to come to court to testify at trial (in cases that would
otherwise not be a high priority for the officer).
To some extent, the answer to this is in client counseling, so
that defendants know exactly what they are risking when they
agree that trial (or refusing to take an early plea) is the better
option. Also, a focus on quality-of-life misdemeanors will
necessarily limit any retaliatory response to exercising the right
to trial, as these offenses tend to have lower direct criminal
sanctions. However, this concern is not without merit.
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3. Losing the Benefit of Lower Criminal Court Chaos

What about individuals who benefit from the lower court
chaos? These are generally repeat defendants, those who cycle
through the system multiple times and benefit from the sheer
volume in lower court by getting decent plea offers for cases in
which (given their records) they might otherwise spend more time
in jail. In some jurisdictions, particularly those with speedy trial
statutes,133 the chaos of the lower criminal courts benefits
individuals willing to come to court many times and wait things
out; those individuals are more likely to gain a speedy trial
dismissal or to wear the prosecution down and get a deferred
adjudication.
As those who have practiced in multiple jurisdictions know,
particular benefits from chaotic courts are not universal.134 And
the very same process costs that an overburdened system imposes
to the benefit of some defendants works to the great detriment of
many others who lose valuable work days and money coming to
court multiple times.135 Most important, those who benefit from
chaos due to sheer volume will certainly benefit more if they were
never part of that volume in the first place.
V. Conclusion
Things have changed radically since Kelling and Wilson
described the Newark beat cop who told loiterers to move on and
noisy teens to keep quiet, and the judge who rarely saw people
“caught up in a dispute over the appropriate level of
neighborhood order.”136 Today, millions of misdemeanors—many
of them low-level, order-maintenance misdemeanors—end up in

133. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1972) (setting out New
York’s statutory speedy trial limitations).
134. For example, student-attorneys raising a speedy trial dismissal issue in
Syracuse, New York, under the same statute used with frequent success some
250 miles away in New York City, were apparently the first to do so in recent
memory in that courthouse.
135. See FEELEY, supra note 58, at 292 (discussing the costs associated with
overburdened defense attorneys); Howell, supra note 8, at 292–306 (same).
136. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 8, at 29.
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the lower criminal courts.137 The result is mass misdemeanor
processing through a criminal justice system that saddles
individuals, and thus society, with harmful arrest and criminal
records for minor offense convictions.
Failures in the delivery of Gideon’s promise of effective
representation for indigent defendants have led some to call for
triage in the lower criminal courts, with less attention paid to
those charged with minor misdemeanors, or even the total denial
of counsel. Instead, public defenders should focus resources on
misdemeanors, encouraging clients to reject quick, seemingly
“easy” (but actually quite burdensome) guilty pleas, whether the
result is a better disposition later in the case or a trial. Either
way, refusing to process individuals quickly through the lower
criminal courts will impose some of the real cost of mass
misdemeanor processing on that system, in the hopes of
“crashing” it. The “crash” would not be a dramatic event. Instead,
if defense counsel litigated some of the many factual and legal
issues that misdemeanors present, the system would grind to a
halt under its own weight. The representation would be nothing
more than Gideon and its progeny require, but would place the
burden of mass misdemeanor processing on the courts and
prosecution. Under this weight, legislators might act to reduce
the short- and long-term costs of mass misdemeanor policing.
Prosecutors, who should exercise discretion to reduce volume in
the overburdened courts, would likely exercise this discretion.
Police offers, who should exercise discretion on the street, would
be encouraged to maintain order without making unnecessary
arrests.

137. MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 1, at 11 (estimating that
“the total number of misdemeanor prosecutions in 2006 was about 10.5
million”).

